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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
~I 0 LLE H

r I> \ ~

i\ L I XES,
u. eorporation, and
Lllll~RTY :\IUTUl\L lXRURANCE
(.'()~I P .A\ Y, a corporation,
l\

Plaintiffs,
Case No.

vs.

10101

TilE I~Dl"~rrHil\L COl\f~IISSION
OF l~T.\11, TY\~EX .:\1)1\~lH,
\r .\~.\ T,CH CONHTRUCTION
(.'()~IP ..\~-y and THE STATE
~~~l"H.\XCE F,l;XD,

DrfPJldaJlts.

X;\TlTRE OF THE CASE
Thi~ i~

hPn~fit~

an
under

app~al

th~

fro1n an order awarding injury
,,. . orkn1en ·~ Co1npensation Act .

.A.n order ,,-a~ entered by The Industrial Commission
for the applicant and against Plaintiffs Mollerup \ . . an
Line~ and Liberty ~Iutual Insurance Co1npany and
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dismissing the action against defendants Wasatch Construction Company and the State Insurance Fund, and
after an application for rehearing \\~as denied, thi~
appeal followed.
RELIEF

SOl~GHT

OX APPEAL

Plaintiffs l\I ollerup \7" an Lines and Liberty l\1 utnal
Insurance Company, herein called ~~ ollflrup and Liberty,
seek reversal of the order as a matter of la\\T and dismissal of the action against them.
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
The applicant, Tyven Adams, suffered an industrial
accident on April 8, 1958, during his employment \rith
~follerup.
( R-72). While attempting to lift a truck
\\TlH_}Pl onto its axle (R-32), he slipped and something
"popped" in his back, causing hin1 to fall to the ground
(R-32, 33). Little or no \\Tor king time \vas lost as a result,
but chiropractic treatlnents \Vere authorized by the
Indus trial Co1nmission ( R-:23, 69). Applicant's back
continued to trouble hiu1 some\vhat, but did not prPvent
his working (ll-~-t~) or oth(_lr norrnal activities (R-24).
Based upon this accident, application for a hearing
entitled: "Tyven Adan1s, Applicant, v. Liberty ~Iutual,
Defendant, Clai1n .K o. l.J[ 140-99~' \\Tas made by the
applicant to the Industrial l~onunission on July 13, 1960
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referred to a ~r edical Advisory
nllt\l'd, \rhieh PXH.lllined the applicant On January 28,
t ~)f) t ( H-;);q and upon its findings the Co1nmission
ordPrt'd a hunp su1n paytnPnt of $37 4.50 to the applicant
hY. LihPrtv. ' as insurPr of ~[ollerup, as co1npensation for
n "IH'rtiutnent disability amounting to 5% loss of bodily
function .. (R-;>~). "·hich a1nount was paid on February
:~. 19(il. and H<'<'Ppted hy the applicant.
( H-68). rrhe

('H~P \\·a~

rrhereafter, on February 26, 1963, the applicant
sought a hParing upon an application entitled HTyven
.\datu~ ••\pplicant, v. The State Insurance Fund, Defendant. ( ~laitn No. ()()(i-t,'' based on a claimed industrial
a<·eident of Oetober '27, 1962 while employed by Wasatch
Con~trurtion Con1pany (R-4). The applicant had been
~tanding on the tongue of some heavy construction
Pquiptnent, pulling on a cable, when the cable suddenly
crune loo~<'. The applicant lost his balance and stepped
back off the equip1nent into a hole, causing a "kink"
in hi~ back (R-15 ). The applicant continued to work at
n lt\~~ ~trenuous rate (R-19) until X ove1nber 28, 1962,
at \vhich titnt\ lu~ '"n~ ter1ninated because of a cut in force
nnd ha~ not \\"or ked since ( R-:29).
The applicant had also sustained a back injury in
Jnnt'. 19(i0, "·hile en1ployPd by ~lick Iverson's Service
~tation a~ he "·as lifting a battery out from under the

hood of a car (R.-115). He suffered an immediate pain in
hi:' back for \Yhich he sought chiropractic treatment and
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which subsequently forced him to seek lighter \Vork
(R-25).
On April 15, 1963, the hearing on Claim No. 606-t
was held with the applicant present and the defendants
Wasatch Construction Company and The State Insurance Fund l'l'lH'e~t>nb:cl (R-11). Tht• Referee, upon
discovery of the applicant's prior back injuries while
e1nployed by ~lollerup and :ThJick 1v(·rson, referred the
matter to a 1\led.ical Advisory Panel, \Yhich exa1nined
the applicant and reported by letter on July 26, 1963,
its conclusion that the applicant's Hpresent condition
reprPsents a continuation of the injury of April 8, 195S,
and the subsequent minor accidents have not been
sigificant in the overall progress of his condition sincP
that injury" ( R-79).
J\Iollerup and Liberty W'ere added as parties
defendant to the applicanfs Claim No. 6064 by order
of the Co1nmission dated ~epte1nber 3, 1963 (R-8±),
and another hearing on Clairn .:\ o. 6064 "·as held
~~ ove1nher 13, 1963, at \\·hich tin1e the ~ledical Panel
Chairrnan, Dr. l~oyd Holbrook, and the applicant "·pre
exarnined (R-89). lTpon eross-exarnination, Dr. Holbrook
conceded that the applicant suffered fron1 pre-existing
progrPssivP degPn(•rativP ehang<'s in his back prior to
the 1~)38 accident ( 1~-103), that the applicant's condition
\\'as aggravated h)~ Parh of the three subsequent accidents
(R-105 ), and that it \\·as difficult to say ,,·hich of the
accidents had greatPr "'pushing do\\Tn ,, pffect (R-106).
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l~y

ordPr of thP (~on1mission dated January 8, 19'64,
thP dPt'l\ndants '\""asatch Construction Company and
The ~tatP Jnsurance Fund were dismissed from the
procPPdings and l\follerup and Liberty were directed to
pay the applicant ··temporary total disability from
J anuar~p 1, 1963 until the applicant is released by his
nttendi ng physician" and they were further ordered
to ""proffer to the applicant the needed surgical treattnPnf' (R-131).
A petition for rehearing was filed by ~Iollerup and
Liberty "·ithin the time provided by law. The petition
wns denied February 6, 1964 (R-139).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION DID NOT INVOKE, NOR COULD
IT HAVE INVOKED, ITS STATUTORY POWER OF CONTI:\UING JURISDICTION OF THE APPLICANT'S PRIOR
CLAI~I AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS.

The Conunission hearing of November 13, 1963 was
ha~t\d upon the applicant's Claim No. 6064 against
\ra~atch Construction Company and was not a continued
litigation of the prior Claim No. I~I 1±0-99, which had
alrPady been filed, settled, and closed. The record
reveals the Conunission's intent "\vhen Commissioner
\Vie~ ley \\·a~ confronted ""ith this question:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Mr. Snow: . . . . Now I don't think that is
the la\v, and I see no basis for a reopening here.
If that is what this is, although I confess I am
not sure it is an attempt to reopen.
"Referee: It isn't a reopening. It's a further
hearing."
The Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, Section
35-1-78, U.C.A., 1953, allows a reopening of a previously
settled and concluded claim. It reads:
"The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it
may from time to time make such modification
or change with respect to former findings, or
orders with respect thereto, as in its opinion may
be justified, provided, however, that records
pertaining to cases, other than those of total
permanent disability or \Yhere a claim has been
filed as in 35-1-99, '"·hich have been closed and
inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the co1nmission."
The Commissioner understood the pow·er to invoke
this jurisdictional section of this statute and noted thP
established procedure for doing so, but he expressly
denied that Claim No. IM 140-99 "Tas under consideration.
HMr. Sno\\,.:
But "Then the Connnission follo\vs out the :Jlediral Advisory Board by sending us notice of
\vhat the deter1nination is, and "That should be
paid, and ",.e pay it and the file is closed, that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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constitut(ls, it seems to 1ne, at the very least
an acceptanee by all parties, and a ratification of a non-statutory medical advisory board
finding.
••Referee:
Yes. Now if an application was on file within
the three-year limit, then the applicant could
reopen that by filing an application for furthPr and additional compensation, because of
the continuing jurisdiction section of the statute. Which I can't consider this procedure as
an application for further and additional compensation under that case.
··~rr.

Snow:

I can't see how you could either. I agree.
That is 'Yhy I a1n 'vondering 'vhat I am doing
here." (R-128.>
It is obvious from the above recital that in order
for Claim I~l 140-99 to be reopened the applicant must
file "an application for further and additional compensation·· against the Plaintiffs and such was never
arcotnplishPd in the instant case.

By reference to not having "issued any order'' to
reopen Claiiu I~I 140-99, the Commissioner concedes the
legal necessity of issuing some notice to the Plaintiffs
that the Commission is reopening the formerly settled
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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claim. Such a require1nent is discussed by this Court in
Spring Canyon Coal Co., et al. v. Industrial Commissiou
of Utah, 60 lT tah 533, :210 P. 611 ( 1922). After quoting
the Code section on continuing jurisdiction, this Court
said at page 614:
''It is perhaps unnecessary to state that in
order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Commission, under the section just quoted, due notice
should be given to necessary parties, \vhich notice
should state the objective of the proceedings,
together \vith the nature and rharactPr of the
relief sought."
The record sho\vs that such notice "ras never issued
to the Plaintiffs. Thus the hearing of November 13,
1963 was solely based upon the ne\\T Claim, X o. 6064, and
Plaintiffs \Vert> brought into that clai1n as defendants
to the ne\\'" action against \Y. asatch Construction Company-.
Had there been an atten1pt to invoke the continuing
jurisdiction of the Connnission as to Clai1n X o. Il\1 140-99,
the Co1nmission \\Tas \vithout the legal powrer to do so
under thP facts of this case. The broad jurisdictional
powPr given to the Industrial Co1nmission under Section
35-1-78

doe~

arbitrary

not giYe the Collunission an unli1nited or

po\vc~r

to ignore all principles of res judicata

and co1n1nence to re-litigate elai1ns, sueh as Claim 1~1
140-99, \\Thich have once been heard, settled, and closed.
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{)n thP contrary, la\\· determined by this Court has
<·ont'inPd the Cotnnti~~ion's power thereunder to cases
whPrP thPrP i~ a sho\\·ing of some change or new developtnPnt whir.h <'nuld not have been anticipated by the
Conuni:-;~ion at the first hearing of the claim and \vhich
1:-; not <'HU~Pd hy subsequent independent events .

.Act na

J.~ife

Ins. Co., et al. v. Industrial Commission
of l ,·tah, ef al., 73 l Ttah 366, 274 P. 139 (192.9), explained
the litnits put upon the statute at p. 145:
H'"fhP Utah Statute does not expressly state
that good cause must be shown after an award
is once 1nade to authorize jurisdiction by the
Conunission as does the California statute, but
\VP are of the opinion, as held in the case of
~alt Lake v. Industrial Comn1ission, supra, that
good cause must be shown, especially if the previous a\vard purports to be final.''
~._',' alt

Lake ( \ify r. Industrial Comrnission, 61 Utah
51-l, :2L-) P. 10·±'7 (1923), explains the "good cause"
rPfPrred to in the ..Jrt ua case at p. 1048:

.,,

HIt certainly \vas not intended by that section
that the Commission might resume jurisdiction
of a case that had been once regularly determined
\\·ithout son1e change or ne\v development in the
injury complained of not known to the parties
\vhen the former award was made.
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" . . . . The Court is of the opinion that the
foregoing is a reasonable and logical interpretation of . . . (the Section), and that any other interpretation would invite endless litigation in this
class of cases."

Continental Casualty Co., et al. v. industrial Commission of Utah et al., 70 Utah 354, 260 P. 279 (1927)
explains at p. 283 that :
"There must be a changed condition or a
development of some kind to justify a modification of the previous award either in favor of
or against the applicant."
The requirements, thus set out, were restated in
Carter v. Industrial Commission, 76 l"Ttah 520, 290 P.
776 (1930) by referring to Brklacic v. Industrial Commission, 63 Utah 582, 227 P. 1036 and numerous subsequent cases have restated and confirmed the rule.
Even when the Commission finds cause for assuming its continuing jurisdiction, Johnson v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 93 lTtah 493, 73 P. 2d 1308 (1937)
at p. 1309 thus restricts the scope of the matters considered:
"Notwithstanding the continuing jurisdiction
of the Co1nmission over the case, the aw·ard as
1nade "~as a final adjudication as to the matters
therein decided including the issue as to the
plaintiff's condition then existing."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It i~ PvidPnt upon the record in the instant case
that Cluin1 X o. 1~1 140-99 determined that the applicant's
injury nH of .Jan nary :2H, 1.961, amounted to a "permanent
,}isahility ol' ;>/~" (1{-53). lt is further evident that
linhi lity for ~aid disability \Yas paid to and accepted by
thP appli<'nnt, thu~ rlo~ing that claim (R-49).

'ro reopen that clai1n, the applicant \Yas obligated to
proYP
\rhieh

~otne

<'hnng't' or nP\Y develop1nent in his case
,,·a~ not kno\Yn hy the Commission on January 30,
l~)fil, \rh~n itH Order \ras 1nade. The hearing on NovemIH'r 1:~. l~)fi:~ n~ither \\"as sought h~" the applicant for such
purpo~P nor, a~ "~in be Hhown by argument under Point
1II, \Va~ any ehange or nP\Y development, referable to the
1!l.~)S arridPnt. proven.
POINT II
THE I~DUSTRIAL COlVIMISSION HAD NO JURISDICTIO~

0\"ER

~lADE

BY THE APPLICANT.

THE

PLAINTIFFS

UNDER

THE

CLAIM

HaYing determined that the new and independent
Claitn Xo. ()06-t. not Clain1 Xo. I~[ 140-99, \Yas under con~id~ration at the hearin2: on X ovember 13 1963 it is
LJ

'

'

oln·ion~ that thP Conuui~sion could not have jurisdiction
nYt~r the . .\.ppellants. The doctrine of res judicata under

l.~tah la\Y bar~ the subsequent filing of a new claim based
t'll

a previous litigated and concluded claim in \\r orkmen's
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Compensation cases as 'vell as any other type of legal
action.
In Spencer v. Industrial Commission of Utah, et al.,
4 lTtah 2d 185, 290 P. 2d 692 (1955), this Court explained
the doctrine of res judicata as applied to Workmen's
Compensation cases. After discussing the llffect of Section 35-1-78 (continuing jurisdiction) on the doctrine, this
Court said at p. 694:
"It is not to be assumed from the above that
an applicant may reapply to the Commission for
a new determination upon the same facts merely
because he may be dissatisfied with its former
order, any more than it means that the defendant
in such a proceeding could do so. The act provides
that a party aggrieved by the action of the Commission may apply for a rehearing or seek a
revie"T in this Court "'"ithin the time prescribed
by la,v. This is the exclusive means of securing
a review of determination made on any given
state of facts. If this is not done, it is inconceiveable that the Legislature intended, or that the law
should be, that the party could file a new application and have the Commission redeter1nine his
case on identical facts.''
The general rule as to res judicata as applied to
'Vorkmen's Co1npensation cases is set out in 99 C.J.S.
200, 204 (Workmen's Co1npensation, Sections 853 and
854):
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··Except as provided othPr\\"ise by statute,
u final a\\·ard or judgment in a co1npensation
<·asP is like a final judgn1Pnt in any other case,
nnd, subjPet to the right of appeal, is conclusive
as to all matters "yhich Inay be adjudicable, and
all issues before the tribunal at the time of the
Pntry of its decision ...
''Statutes authorizing review or modification
of an a\\·ard or judgment or a change of condition,
the reorcurence of incapacity, or its aggravation,
increase, dilninution or termination do not affect
the conclusiveness of the award or judgment in
question as to matters of law or fact residing in
the adjudication. In proceedings brought under
such statutes the original or prior award or judgInent is conclusive of all questions determined
""hether of la\v or of fact, or which might have
hPen presented and determined ... "
The applicanf~ only rernedy as to Plaintiffs was,
therefore, an application for n1odification of the Order
PntPred in Claim K o. Il\I 140-99.
POINT III
THE ORDER OF THE COl\Il\iiSSION IS UNLAWFUL
BECAl~SE ITS FINDINGS ARE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS

AXD COXTRARY TO THE lJXCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE.
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The applicant may not recover frou1 the Plaintiffs
unless there is some evidence that the 1958 aceident,
uninterrupted by an independent intervening cause,
produced his present condition. The co1nvensability of an
aggravation or "lighting up" of a prior disease or infirmity caused hy an industrial accident is established
hy a long line of cases decided hy this Court. See
ll1akoff Compa11y v. Industrial Co111rnission, 13 lTtah 2d
23, 368 P. 2d 70 (1962).
In Spencer v. Industrial Commission, et al., 87 l~tah
336, 40 P. 2 188 ( 1935), this Court explained the reason
for the rule at page 197 :
" A claim for compensation may not be denied
because a new injury 'lighted up, reopened or
revived an existing infirmity of the injured employee.' X o standai·d of health or physical fitness
for an employment is prescribed by our statute
to entitle an e1nployee to con1pensation for an
injury arising by accident out of or in the course
of his employment. Apparently, \vhen one enters
an employment, the Pnlployer takes the employee
as he is."
The criteria set up in these case8 for deter1nining
the aggravation is \\yhether the e1nployee'~ ability to
verfor1n the saute ty1 )e of \York has been reduced by the
accident. In T,intic illilring Co., et a!. v. Industrial Co·m-

Jnissi.on of Utah, et al., 60 {Ttah 14, 206 P. 278, 23 A.L.R.
325 ( 1922), this Court pointed out the change in the
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Ptnploype's eapaeity to eontinue his regular employment
and statPd at page 279:

"If the plaintiff's contention is true, that the
injury of \vhich Snyder complains is but a continuation of a disease previously existing, unaggravated or unaccelerated by any fortuitous
pv·ent \\Thieh rnay he denominated an accident,
then, in Yi ew of the statute quoted, the injury is
not compensable and the award made by the
Co11unission should be vacated, annulled and set
aside. On the other hand, if the findings of the
Conunission are true, that ... (the accident) ...
\ras either the direct cause of the tuberculosis or
lighted up a dormant condition which existed
previously, but which had not incapacitated him
for performing his duties as an employee, then
thP award made by the Cornmission should not
be disturbed .... ''
.A.ll Pvidence in the instant case conclusively shows that
the applicant's disability "Tas immediately increased by
both U1P Iverson and Wasatch accidents. After the
~lollerup accident, his back didn't give him . . . "any
trouble to speak of ... " and as he states ... ''I was able
to do anything I \vanted to." (R-36) He continued his
~rune \\'"ork for ~lollerup into 1959 (R-108) at which ti1ne
h~ aeeeptPd other equally strenuous work at Kennecott
(R-10S), Flruning Gorge Darn (R-110) and l\tiick Iverson's
~Prviee station (R-110, 111). But the accident at Iverson's
ean~ed an inunediate change in "~orking capacity:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
"Q. Would you say that you have had trouble
off and on ever since that time~
"A. Yes. A little. But it hasn't been anything
serious, or anything to bother me much,
until after the l\Iick Iverson deal." (R-24)
and resulted in forcing the applicant to
subsequently take lighter work:

SPP

doctors and

"Q. Now from that time on, the Iverson incident,
what was your ability to work~ Were you
able to do most anything J?
"A. No. That's the reason I took that service
station. Was to try to get off where it was
easy. Where I could take my o'vn - Well,
didn't have to hit the ball, like you do on the
job.
'~Q.

So following the Iverson injury you took
'vhat you thought would be lighter work, by
running your o'vn servire station ; is that
correct~

'~A.

y

e~.

"Q. Did you receive any treat1nent follo,ving
the Iverson injury?
4'

A. Oh, yes. That is "Then I went to the chiropractor up in the avenues here ... I went to
him as long as the insurance fund would let
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mP, and then I visited doctors - Dr. Argyle,
and Dr. 1 1 ~Van~, and Dr. Clegg, and Dr. Eddington, all of thP rest of them - since,
trying to get relief." (R-25,)
Th ..

r~eord al~o

shows a marked change in the
applica.nf~ eondition following the Wasatch accident.
He inunediately contacted a doctor for pain pills (R-17)
and \Va~ allo\\·~d to \vork "in a slow, easy manner"
( R-4-1) until November 28, 1962, since which time he has
hPen nnabl~ to \\·ork at all (R-43, 45).
rrhe tnedical PVidence COmpels a finding that the
I vPrson and \Yasatch accidents aggravated the applicant'~ prior condition. The testimony of Dr. Boyd Holbrook upon ero~~-exa1nination established:
(a) That the applicant suffered from a back
condition prior to 1958 which was progressive
and degerative in nature (R-103),
(b) That each of the three accidents caused a
\\·ors~ning of that condition (R-105), and
(e) That 1nedically it is difficult to say
"·hich of the accidents had the greatest adverse
effect (R-106).
These conclusions stand uncontradicted by other medical
evidence and, as this Court held in Oberg v. SOJYIAders et
al .. 111 Ctah 507. 184 P. 2d 229, (1947) on page 235,
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"the testin1ony of a \Yitness is no stronger than \\rhere
it is left on cross-examination." No evidence, medical
or otherwise, \\ras presented to establish a casual relationship between the 1958 l\f ollerup accident and the
applicant'~ present condition.
The Commission seemingly based its Order upon
the conclusion stated in the l\fedical Panel report of July
7, 1963. Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., 1953, makes it the duty
of the Commission to refer the "medical aspects of the
case" to the Medical Panel which is to make an examination of the injured and report it findings. The duty of
the Co1nmission is then to consider the medical evidence
obtained from the Panel together "rith all other evidence
presented to it in arriving at a finding which \Vill, und(-'f
the law, support an Order. The statute does not permit
the Medical Panel to

assunH~

the Commission's duty of

determining the liability of the parties according to the
law.
The Commission's Order was based upon mere
conjecture. It \\Tas arbitrary, capricious~ and not based
upon evidence. This Court held in Continental Casualty
Co., et rd. v. Industrial Connnission of Utah, 75 Utah

220, 284 P. 313 (19:29) at page 314 that:

"An a\vard cannot rest upon 1nere conjecture or
possibility."
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In .1/akoff ( 1oJJI})(IJI,IJ v. Industrial Commission of
l~tah. cl a/., S'Upra. Ri<·hard Howell suffered from a back
c·otulition dating l'ro1n an accident in 1955. In 1957, Mr.
llnwPll slipped on stairs \vhi le en1ployed by Makoff's,
('rtttsing- an aggravation of the prior condition. In 1960,

hP ngain injured his back \\~hile putting on his trousers.
Thi~ Con rt nffirinPd 1\1 r. 1-1 o"rell's award against Makoff
nndPr the aggravation rule and pointed out that it was
inllnatPrial \vho his e1nployer was in 1955, as this would
not altPr ~lakofl'·s liability for the aggravation. The
appellants here ~Pek a consistent ruling.
CON·OLUSION
The Conunission never intended that its hearing on
thi~ ea~t· inYolvP thP prior claiin made by the applicant
ag-ainst LihPrty ~lutual in 1960. That claim was deterntined and closed and no change or new development
\\·a~ ~ho\vn to require the granting of further compensation therPunder.

To hring the Plaintiffs into a ne\v action filed
again~t another e1nployer years later is directly against
the do('trine of res judicata and the provisions of the
\Y orlanen ·s Co1npensation Act providing for a modification of prior Order~.
If the Connuission·s Order be upheld, in this case,
the a~gravation rule "rill be denied its application and
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the employer who chanced to be involved in the first
of a series of aggravations of a degenerative condition,
will be burdened with a responsibility which should rightfully be shared by all employers in proportion to the
increase in disability caused by their accidents. Such
an Order cannot be permitted to stand.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN H. SNOW and
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENS·EN

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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